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The so-called “Rise of the Machines” has 
fundamentally transformed the organiza-
tion of work during the last four decades. 
While enthusiasts are captivated by the 
new technologies, many worry that these 
machines will eventually lead to mass 
unemployment, as robots and computers 
substitute for human labor. 
This Public Paper shows that these con-
cerns are likely to be exaggerated. Despite 
rapid technological progress and automa-
tion, unemployment has not dramatically 
expanded over time. Instead, employment 
shifted from the most highly automated 
sectors to other sectors that experienced 
less technological progress, as well as 
emerging sectors that were created by 
new technology. 
While computers have little impact on 
overall employment, however, they con-
tribute to rising inequality. Machines 
have overtaken humans in their capability 
to execute well-defined routine tasks pre-
cisely, and many of the production and 
clerical jobs that specialize in these tasks 
have been irreversibly lost. As a result, the 
employment structure of labor markets in 
developed countries has become increas-
ingly polarized as employment concen-
trates in a set of highly paid and a set of 
lowly paid occupations, both of which are 
difficult to automate. 
As computerization changes the composi-
tion of human labor rather than decreas-
ing its overall amount, policymakers 
should not be primarily concerned about 
mass unemployment. Instead, the more 
immanent policy challenges caused by 
computerization result from changing 
skill demands in the labor market and ris-
ing economic inequality among workers.
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The first fifteen years of the 21st century 
have been a difficult period for workers 
in developed economies. In many 
wealthy European, North American, and 
East Asian countries, the share of popu-
lation holding a job has declined, and 
wage growth for the average worker has 
slowed or even turned negative. The 
“Great Recession” of the years 2007–
2009 is to blame for an important part 
of this decline in workers’ fortunes. 
However, the employment rate in the 
United States had already been falling for 
several years prior to this crisis, and 
labor markets in many countries 
remained depressed for a remarkably 
long time after the recession had offi-
cially ended.1 New evidence also suggests 
that the fraction of national income 
obtained by workers has been declining 
for at least three decades in developed 
countries.2
It is therefore natural to hypothesize that 
labor markets are not just in a temporary 
slump, but instead face a fundamental 
force that increasingly deteriorates work-
ers’ outlook for finding a job. Computer 
technology is an obvious candidate for 
that role. Whether one enters an office 
building or a factory, the widespread use 
of personal computers, communication 
devices, computer-guided machines, and 
robots is a striking feature of the work-
place of the 21st century. Computer 
technology often replaces work tasks 
that humans previously executed, and 
one thus wonders whether continued 
technological development will eventu-
ally lead to the obsolescence of most 
human labor.
This essay discusses the impact of tech-
nology on the labor markets in devel-
oped countries. It argues that an 
imminent large decline in the demand for 
human labor is far from certain, and that 
speculation about the long-term evolu-
tion of employment is inherently diffi-
cult. However, there are already 
hundreds of years of experience regard-
ing the technological change of the past, 
and researchers have been able to study 
the impact of computer technology on 
the labor market for several decades. I 
argue that the evidence from the distant 
and recent past reveals recurring pat-
terns, which may usefully guide expecta-
tions about technology’s impact on labor 
markets in the near future.
Introduction
5Gordon E. Moore, co-founder of Fairchild 
Semiconductor and Intel Corporation, 
predicted in 1975 that technological prog-
ress in the semiconductor industry would 
allow a doubling in the number of elec-
tronic components per microchip every 
two years, thus leading to rapid progress 
in computer processing power. This pre-
diction, which became known as 
“Moore’s Law,” has held up remarkably 
well since then. The dramatic progress in 
semiconductor technology led to great 
performance improvements in many elec-
tronic devices, and to rapidly declining 
prices of computing equipment. Data 
compiled by the economist William Nord-
haus indicates that the cost per million 
Is Technological Development 
Just Beginning or About to End?
computing operations has been falling 
spectacularly since the 1950s (Figure 1).3
Computers are not only becoming cheaper 
and more powerful, but also more versa-
tile. New applications in areas such as 
machine learning, artificial intelligence, 
and mobile robotics hold great promise 
for expanding the use of computer tech-
nology to an ever-wider set of tasks. One 
of the most publicized innovations in 
recent years is the self-driving car, which 
may profoundly reshape ground transpor-
tation in the 21st century.
Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee, 
two scholars at the MIT Sloan Business 
   Manual       Mechanical       Vacuum       Transistor       Microprocessor
Source: Nordhaus (2001)
Note: The costs represent $ per million standardized computing operations per second (MSOPS).
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Fig. 1 Evolution of cost per computing operation (1850–2010)
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School, argue that the rapid fall in com-
puter prices and the wider applicability 
of computer technology are heralding a 
“Second Machine Age” that will trans-
form the economies of developed coun-
tries to an even greater degree than the 
Industrial Revolution.4 As ever-cheaper 
robots are able to execute an ever-greater 
range of tasks, firms will only hold on to 
workers as long as a machine cannot exe-
cute their jobs more cheaply. The result is 
enormous downward pressure on work-
ers’ wages, and as these wages fall below 
a reservation level—the minimum level of 
wages that makes it worthwhile for peo-
ple to hold a job—a rapidly growing pool 
of unemployed individuals will form.  
A technology-driven disappearance of 
most employment opportunities will pro-
foundly change society, and will require a 
new organization of many public institu-
tions. Despite the chilling outlook of mass 
unemployment, the Second Machine Age 
will not only produce losers, however. 
The widespread use of cheap robots in 
production will lower production costs, 
and the resulting productivity increase 
raises aggregate societal wealth. However, 
these gains are likely to be concentrated 
among a small group of owners of com-
puter capital, while a much larger fraction 
of the society will suffer from the loss of 
gainful employment. It is an interesting 
intellectual exercise to think about appro-
priate public policies that could success-
fully deal with a workless and highly 
unequal society.
The jobless robot age predicted by Bryn-
jolfsson and McAfee is, however, far 
from certain. Quite to the opposite, Rob-
ert Gordon, an economic historian from 
Northwestern University, posits that 
technological change is slowing rather 
than accelerating.5 He argues that the 
period of greatest technological advance 
in history is not the computerization of 
the late 20th and early 21st century, but 
the hundred years from the early 1870s 
to the early 1970s. This century of 
“Great Innovation” saw the discovery of 
electricity and the development of a pan-
oply of electrical devices; the invention of 
the internal combustion engine which 
revolutionized transportation; a great 
improvement in sanitary and living con-
ditions due to running water, indoor 
plumbing, and central heating; the ability 
to rearrange molecules which permitted 
great progress in the development of 
pharmaceuticals, plastics, and other 
chemical products; and the introduction 
of major communication and entertain-
ment technology, following the invention 
of the telephone, the phonograph, pho-
tography, radio, and motion pictures 
within a span of just fifteen years. 
Annual growth of U.S. GDP per capita 
accelerated during the Great Innovation 
period, and peaked at a 2.5% average 
gain per year between 1950 and the onset 
of the oil crisis in 1973. In the four 
decades since, average annual GDP 
growth has been one-third lower at 1.6% 
per year. While annual growth even 
exceeded 4% in the ten years during the 
1950–1973 period, such a high growth 
rate has never again been attained during 
the last thirty years. This slowdown in 
economic growth is not unique to the 
United States, but it is even more pro-
nounced in Japan and in the major Euro-
pean economies. 
Gordon argues that the slowdown in eco-
nomic growth results from a slowdown 
in innovation. The Great Innovation cen-
tury, which was characterized by major 
developments in multiple important tech-
nologies, has been followed by a period 
with a comparatively one-dimensional 
development in computer technology 
alone. Indeed, Gordon makes the provoc-
ative prediction that innovation and eco-
nomic growth will continue to slow as it 
becomes increasingly difficult for human-
ity to come up with fundamentally novel 
discoveries (see Figure 2).
Of course, pathbreaking future innova-
tion is extremely difficult to predict. Who 
would have foreseen today’s omnipres-
7ence of the internet-connected multipur-
pose smartphone just thirty years ago? 
But as much as it is problematic to 
extrapolate the slowdown in economic 
growth into the future, one can also not 
confidently extrapolate past trends in the 
development of computer technology—or 
foresee an acceleration of that develop-
ment—in order to conclude that an age 
of robots is immanent and inevitable.
While long-term predictions are notori-
ously difficult, this essay argues that one 
can learn important lessons from past 
experience. Historical evidence not only 
allows assessing the impacts of past tech-
nological change on the labor market, but 
these impacts can be contrasted with past 
predictions about the transformative 
effects of technology. Indeed, concerns 
about the replacement of workers by 
machines date back many centuries, and 
there also is mounting evidence on the role 
of computers and robots in the labor mar-
ket during the last three to four decades.
   Actual UK        Actual US       Interpolated Hypothetical Path   
Source: Gordon (2012)
Note: Growth in real GDP per capita with actual and hypothetical paths.
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Drawing on Past Experience: 
A Short History of Technological 
Change in Textile Production 
Humans have been producing textile 
clothing for thousands of years. In this 
production process, cotton, wool, or 
other fibers are first converted to yarn, 
then yarn is converted to cloth, and 
finally cloth is converted to clothing. 
While the basic sequence of production 
steps remained unchanged over time, 
there were dramatic improvements in the 
execution of each step. During the Indus-
trial Revolution, the textile industry was 
at the forefront of a broader trend 
towards mechanization of production. 
Yet already prior to that transformative 
period, the textile sector provided a use-
ful example for the study of technological 
change and its labor market implications.
A first major innovation in the textile 
sector affected the process of spinning, 
i.e., the conversion of fiber to yarn. His-
torically, humans would attach fibers to 
a spindle and rotate that spindle by hand 
in order to twist fibers to yarn. From 
about the 13th century onwards, these 
hand spindles were gradually replaced by 
spinning wheels, which took advantage 
of the rotational energy of a wheel, and 
greatly increased the productivity of the 
spinning process. 
The introduction of the spinning wheel 
met occasional resistance from the crafts 
guilds that controlled production in 
many European territories. According to 
historical documents, the city council of 
Cologne decided in the year 1412 that a 
local merchant by the name of Walter 
Kesinger would not be allowed to con-
struct a spinning wheel, after he had seen 
such a machine during travels in Italy. 
The council argued that many spinners 
would lose their livelihood if the use of 
the new, more productive technology 
were permitted.6 
Mechanization also reached the second 
production step of the textile industry, 
the weaving of yarn to cloth. As of the 
17th century, a predecessor of the mecha-
nized loom permitted the simultaneous 
production of up to 24 woven ribbons, a 
dramatic improvement over the classical 
loom that could only produce one ribbon 
at a time. To prevent employment loss 
among ribbon weavers, the German 
emperor prohibited the use of this mech-
anized ribbon loom in 1685, and regents 
of many other European territories did 
the same. 
The imposition of technology bans in an 
attempt to prevent employment loss, 
however, proved counterproductive in the 
long run. Right outside the borders of the 
German empire, craftsmen in the Swiss 
city of Basel adopted the new ribbon-
weaving machine, and were thus able to 
produce at much lower cost than their 
German counterparts. Competitive pres-
sure from technology adopters eventually 
led to growing opposition against the 
German empire’s machine ban, which 
was finally revoked in the mid-18th cen-
tury.7  
The process of textile production soon 
changed even more dramatically with a 
series of inventions in the late 18th cen-
tury, at the start of the Industrial Revolu-
tion. The spinning wheel was replaced by 
the “Spinning Jenny,” a multispindle 
spinning frame that could produce many 
yarns at a time. Weaving was revolution-
9ized by the introduction of the power 
loom, an automated loom that was pow-
ered by steam or water energy rather 
than by human hand. 
The new production technology required 
expensive machines and access to a cen-
tral power source. Therefore, the decen-
tralized home production of yarn and 
cloth by spinning wheels and handlooms 
was replaced by mass production in fac-
tories. In a mechanized factory, a single 
worker was able to produce an output 
that would have required dozens of 
workers prior to the Industrial Revolu-
tion. 
The massively reduced need for human 
labor in textile production led to popular 
unrest in England. Unemployed workers 
protested against the new system of fac-
tory production, and in some cases 
attacked factories and smashed machines. 
The British government reacted by mak-
ing “machine breaking” a capital crime. 
The protesting workers, who became 
known as Luddites after their alleged 
leader Ned Ludd, were persecuted and 
their movement broken up. 
A common theme during these centuries 
of technological progress in the textile 
industry was the fear that new labor-sav-
ing technologies would lead to long-term 
mass unemployment. Indeed, the intro-
duction of new machines certainly dis-
rupted the labor market, and many 
workers lost their jobs when their work 
tasks became mechanized. While con-
cerns about technology-induced unem-
ployment were well founded in the short 
run, the predicted long-term decline in 
employment never materialized. 
An intuitive, and yet profoundly mis-
taken view of the labor market is that 
there is a fixed amount of work, which 
can either be done by humans or by 
machines. According to this view—
known to economists as the “lump of 
labor fallacy”—an increasing use of 
machines in the production process nec-
Hand spinning
Woman using a hand spindle. Detail from 
an Ancient Greek Attic white-ground oino-
choe (wine jug), ca. 490 BC, from Locri, 
Italy. 
© British Museum, London
Spinning wheel
Woman spinning with a wheel, from the 
Elizabethan era, early 17th century.
© New York: American Heritage  
Publishing, 1967
Spinning frame
The improved “Spinning Jenny” that was 
used in textile mills, England, 18th century. 
A worker operating a “Spinning Jenny” with 
60 spindels could replace about 25 hand 
spinners.
© 2004–2015 Florida Center for  
Instructional Technology
Automated spinning machine
Factory building with “Mule Jenny,” England, 
1834. A worker operating a “Mule Jenny” 
with 14 spindles could replace about 175 
hand spinners.
© Science Museum/Science and  
Society Picture Library
Key technological changes in the 
spinning industry 
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essarily reduces the work that is available 
to humans. This contention is a fallacy 
because it fails to recognize two channels 
through which even labor-replacing new 
technologies can create additional 
employment. 
First, new technology is often associated 
with the emergence of new industries and 
occupations. The development of spin-
ning machines and power looms, for 
instance, led to the creation of many jobs 
in a new machine-producing industry. 
Second, there is a less obvious but prob-
ably more important job creation effect 
that operates via changes in prices and 
consumer spending. Mass production in 
the textile industry led to a dramatic 
drop in the price of clothing. This price 
decline allowed consumers either to buy 
a greater quantity of clothing with the 
same amount of money, or to buy the 
same amount of clothing at lower cost 
while expanding purchases of other 
goods and services. The resulting increase 
in demand for clothing and other outputs 
led to greater production and rising 
employment in many sectors of the econ-
omy, particularly in those that were not 
directly exposed to labor-saving technol-
ogy. 
Over time, technological change did not 
eliminate employment, but it strongly 
changed its composition. From the 19th 
to the late 20th century, a large part of 
employment first moved from agriculture 
to manufacturing, and later from manu-
facturing to the service sector. It would 
have been unthinkable two centuries ago 
that agriculture, which employed the 
large majority of workers at that time, 
would account merely for a few percent-
age points of overall employment today, 
despite producing a much greater output. 
Yet unemployment has not shown a pro-
nounced upward trend over time, as 
workers have found new employment 
opportunities in industries like health-
care, finance, and entertainment, where 
the rising employment shares would have 
been equally difficult to foresee. By 
ignoring the emergence of new employ-
ment opportunities, many past observers 
of technological change have fallen vic-
tim to the “Luddite fallacy” of wrongly 
predicting a rise of long-term unemploy-
ment (see box on the next page).
11
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Historical data from the United Kingdom, 
where the Luddites staged their protests in 
the early 19th century, illustrate the extent of 
the so-called “Luddite fallacy.” Despite fun-
damental technological change, unemploy-
ment levels show no secular trend. They are, 
however, characterized by strong cyclical 
movements, rising rapidly after World War I, 
in the Great Depression, during the “stagfla-
tion” period of the 1970s, and in the wake of 
the recent financial crisis. This absence of a 
long-term trend is not due to changing defini-
tions of unemployment. As Figure 4 makes 
clear, the percentage of workers in the total 
population has remained remarkably stable, 
hovering around 50 percent for a very long 
time.
The Luddite fallacy in numbers
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The Computer Revolution: 
Renewed Fears about the 
Automation of Work 
The last and continuing wave of techno-
logical change that reached the labor mar-
ket is the adoption of computer tech-
nology in the workplace. Its predecessors 
date back at least to the Industrial Revo-
lution, when the French inventor Joseph 
Marie Jacquard developed a loom oper-
ated by replaceable punched cards, which 
controlled a particular sequence of the 
loom’s operations. The same principle of 
operating machines with programs stored 
on punched cards was later used in main-
frame computers from the 1960s on-
wards. 
The start of the computer revolution is, 
however, often dated to the late 1970s or 
early 1980s. Production in factories was 
already changing rapidly at that time, as 
computer-guided production machines 
became more widely and cheaply avail-
able. These devices included computer 
numerical control (CNC) machines that 
were operated by a computer program, 
and industrial robots that could move a 
robot arm around multiple axes. Comput-
erization also started to affect office 
work, most notably due to the introduc-
tion of personal computers in the early 
1980s. The IBM Personal Computer was 
released in 1981; the downmarket Com-
modore 64, which became the best-selling 
computer of all time, followed in 1982, 
and Apple introduced its iconic Macin-
tosh in 1984. Continued technological 
development has since led to ever more 
powerful and versatile computers, pro-
duction machines, and robots. And great 
advances in communication technology, 
including the World Wide Web and wire-
less communication devices, have further 
increased the reach of these machines.  
The computer revolution quickly ignited 
fears about mass unemployment. As early 
as in 1978, the German news magazine 
Der Spiegel titled: “The computer revolu-
tion: progress creates unemployment.” It 
argued that computers differed from ear-
lier technological innovations, since they 
not only eliminated many jobs in auto-
mating sectors, but also failed to create a 
meaningful number of new jobs in com-
puter production or elsewhere in the 
economy. The article cited a British 
union leader who predicted that by the 
year 2000, most jobs would have been 
replaced by computers. This pessimistic 
prediction turned out to be quite mis-
taken. The unemployment rate of the 
United Kingdom (see Figure 3), which 
Cover of the 16/1978 edition of the German 
news magazine Der Spiegel.
© DER SPIEGEL
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The fact that computers failed to eliminate most 
human labor in the past four decades despite predic-
tions to the opposite invites a healthy skepticism 
about renewed claims that robots are just about to 
take over from humans.  
stood at 6% in 1978, again hovered 
around 6% in the year 2000, when sup-
posedly most work should already have 
been lost. And it remained at 6% in 
2015, a full 37 years after Der Spiegel 
wrongly predicted a “social catastrophe” 
of unprecedented mass unemployment.
More likely than not, today’s technology 
enthusiasts will be seen as the next vic-
tims of the Luddite fallacy within a few 
decades, thus joining the many previous 
pundits that predicted the end of human 
work in the past. 
Of course, the fact that computers did 
not create mass unemployment does not 
mean that they had no impact on labor 
markets. Quite to the contrary, many 
economists consider computerization, 
along with the globalization of goods 
flows and worker flows, as the main 
driver of change in labor markets during 
the last three or four decades. A closer 
look at computers’ effects on workers 
during that period is warranted both in 
order to understand the recent past, and 
to provide some guidance for thinking 
about possible future impacts of com-
puter technology.
14
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Computers in Economic Theory
Skill-Biased vs Task-Biased 
Technological Change 
Computers became an important topic on 
the research agenda of macroeconomists 
and labor economists in the 1990s. 
Researchers had observed that the wage 
differential between university-educated 
workers and those with lower educational 
attainment had risen rapidly during the 
previous decade, both in the United States 
and in several other developed countries. 
A leading hypothesis to explain the 
growth of wage inequality was skill-
biased technological change (SBTC). It 
posits that new technology and machines 
augment the productivity of all workers, 
but that productivity gains are larger for 
more highly educated workers. The grow-
ing productivity advantage of educated 
workers increases firms’ demand for these 
high-skill employees.
The Harvard economists Claudia Goldin 
and Lawrence Katz have argued that such 
SBTC has taken place throughout the 
20th century, thus continuously raising 
the demand for skilled labor.8 That grow-
ing demand coincided with a rapidly 
growing supply of skilled labor, as aver-
age education levels increased dramati-
cally in all regions of the world. The 
1980s, however, marked a period during 
which the growth in the supply of skilled 
workers slowed in the United States, 
whereas demand for these workers con-
tinued to grow or even accelerated. The 
excess growth of skill demand relative to 
skill supply generated an increase in the 
relative wage of workers with higher edu-
cation, and thus greater wage inequality 
in the labor market.
Through the lens of the SBTC hypothesis, 
computers are seen as the continuation of 
a long sequence of technological innova-
tions that have favored more highly edu-
cated workers. But how exactly could 
one explain that computers raise the rela-
tive productivity of university-educated 
workers? David Autor and Frank Levy 
from the Massachusetts Institute of Tech-
nology and Richard Murnane of Harvard 
University conducted field studies that 
analyzed the introduction of computer 
technology in firms, and they observed 
computers’ impact on employment levels, 
wages, and job content of different types 
of workers. Based on their findings, they 
formulated a more refined theory for the 
impact of computers on the labor mar-
ket, which has become known as the 
task-biased technological change (TBTC) 
hypothesis.9
In the TBTC model, computers do not 
have a differential impact on workers 
based on their education levels, but based 
on the task content of their occupations. 
This model draws on the key observation 
that computers have distinct strengths and 
weaknesses when it comes to executing 
different work tasks. A personal computer, 
CNC machine, or robot is directed by 
software that was prespecified by a pro-
grammer. Computers are thus good at 
executing tasks that follow a well-defined 
procedural routine. These “routine tasks” 
are often found in repetitive production 
work. The production of car bodies in the 
automotive industry, for instance, requires 
that the exact same work steps be 
repeated over and over, while the margin 
for error is small in order to ensure high 
quality and replaceability of parts. Robots 
are much better than humans at executing 
such high-precision repetitive work. 
15
Routine tasks also appear in a second 
area of the labor market. Many clerical 
occupations deal with data work, includ-
ing data processing, data storage, data 
retrieval, and data transmission. When-
ever these data tasks are executed accord-
ing to clearly specified rules, then they 
belong to the set of routine tasks that can 
readily be done by computers. For 
instance, computers now execute many 
tasks that were previously done by 
accountants, file clerks, or secretaries.
While computers are often better than 
humans at doing routine tasks, they face 
important limitations in the execution of 
other tasks. Machines that follow a pre-
specified program cannot readily produce 
new ideas and inventions, and struggle to 
react to unforeseen influences on their 
work. Moreover, computers and machines 
often lack good interfaces for dealing 
with people and objects. This includes 
limitations in verbal communication with 
humans, as well as difficulties with the 
recognition and physical handling of 
objects—all tasks that require versatility 
and adaptation to the environment.
The TBTC hypothesis summarizes tasks 
that involve problem solving, creativity, 
or managerial leadership under the term 
“abstract tasks.” These tasks all draw on 
human ability to react to new develop-
ments and problems, and to come up with 
new ideas and solutions. Occupations 
that strongly rely on abstract tasks 
include managers, engineers, medical doc-
tors, and researchers. A common feature 
of these jobs is that they require a high 
level of cognitive skill, and typically cor-
responding to a university education. 
While computers tend to be poor substi-
tutes for humans in these occupations, 
80
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Job’s percentile in ranking of occupational mean wages
Note: Occupations are ranked by their average hourly wage in 1980. A job at the 20th percentile earns more than 20% of all jobs 
in the economy, but less than 80% of all jobs. Routine occupations are defined as the ⅓ of occupations with highest routine task 
intensity according to job task data.
Source: Autor and Dorn (2013)
Fig. 5  Which jobs are most exposed to automation?
Percentage of routine-intensive occupations
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they can instead be valuable comple-
ments. Many abstract task-intensive occu-
pations become more productive when 
computers allow a cheaper and more 
rapid processing, storage, and transmis-
sion of data. For instance, an engineer 
who designs bridges benefits when com-
puters permit a rapid calculation of a 
planned object’s static properties, while a 
manager of a large company benefits 
from access to real-time data that indicate 
the state of operations at the firm’s multi-
ple plants. Far from being replaced by 
machines, these workers specializing in 
abstract tasks hence stand to benefit from 
a more widespread use of computers.
The third group of tasks in the TBTC 
model is referred to as “manual tasks,” 
and is characterized by a combination of 
fine motoric movement, visual recogni-
tion, and verbal communication. Manual 
tasks are important in personal service 
occupations such as waiters, childcare 
workers, or hairdressers, but also in 
transportation, repair, and construction 
jobs. Workers in these occupations typi-
cally require relatively little formal 
schooling, since manual tasks build on 
basic abilities such as verbal communica-
tion, seeing and recognizing persons and 
objects, as well as holding and moving 
objects with the human hand. Computers 
have little direct impact on these manual 
task-intensive jobs, which are not easily 
automated, but which also do not benefit 
substantially from an interaction with 
computers in the workplace.
Cleaners of hotel rooms are an excellent 
example not only for illustrating a man-
ual task-intensive job, but also for 
explaining the difference between repeti-
tive and routine work. The sequential 
cleaning of hotel rooms is certainly a 
repetitive chore. However, this repetitive-
ness does not translate to routineness in 
the sense used here. For hotel cleaning to 
be a routine job, it would be necessary 
that the cleaning of one room would 
encompass exactly the same work steps 
and physical movements as the cleaning 
of the next room. But in practice, every 
guest will leave her room in a slightly dif-
ferent state. Apart from differences in 
cleanliness, guests can leave towels, pil-
lows, toiletries, pens and many other 
objects that belong to the hotel in differ-
ent spots within the room. It would be 
very challenging for a robot to find and 
recognize all of the hotel’s objects, assess 
their state of cleanliness, and take the 
appropriate measures of cleaning or 
replacing them. Compared to humans, 
robots are often very limited in their 
physical adaptability, and cannot grip or 
clean many different types of objects. An 
even greater challenge arises when hotel 
guests leave behind novel objects that 
they brought into the room, like a pizza 
box or a jewelry box. It is easy for a 
human to recognize these objects, and to 
decide that the pizza box should be dis-
carded while the jewelry box should be 
kept. The same task, however, presents a 
major obstacle for a machine.
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Labor Market Polarization
In summary, the TBTC hypothesis pre-
dicts a decline of employment in routine 
task-intensive occupations as cheaper and 
more powerful computers become avail-
able, while occupations specializing in 
abstract or manual tasks cannot be read-
ily replaced by machines. These predic-
tions are supported by evidence from 
many countries in North America, 
Europe, and East Asia. For instance, my 
research with David Autor observes that 
the routine task-intensive occupation 
groups of production workers, machine 
operators and clerical workers accounted 
for a roughly constant 37 to 38 percent 
of U.S. labor input from 1950 to 1980, 
before declining rapidly to just 28 per-
cent of U.S. labor in 2005.10 As routine 
occupations contracted, managerial and 
professional occupations that intensively 
use abstract tasks grew rapidly. Employ-
ment in low-skilled service occupations, 
such as waiters, cleaners, and childcare 
workers, has been expanding since the 
1980s; this work is rich in manual tasks. 
Occupations in farming, mining, con-
struction, repair, and transportation, 
which also mostly perform manual tasks, 
were declining rapidly until 1990, but 
have since stabilized their employment 
share.
While the TBTC hypothesis provides 
clear predictions for the distinct effects of 
computerization on occupations that use 
different job tasks, it also has indirect 
implications for the inequality between 
workers of different education or income 
levels. The economists Maarten Goos 
and Alan Manning pointed out that rou-
tine occupations in production and cleri-
cal work tend to be clustered towards the 
middle of the occupational wage distribu-
tion.11 These jobs typically have lower 
wages than abstract task jobs such as 
managers and professionals, but higher 
wages than manual task jobs such as per-
sonal service workers. As a consequence, 
declining employment in routine task-
intensive occupations translates to a pat-
tern of employment polarization, as 
workers become increasingly concen-
trated in the highest and lowest paid 
occupations of the labor market. In fol-
low-up research, Goos, Manning, and 
Anna Salomons showed that this polar-
ization is remarkably pervasive across 
countries. In all 16 European countries 
they studied as well as in the U.S., the 
employment share of occupations with 
   Lowest-paying 3rd       Middle-paying 3rd       Highest-paying 3rd
Percent change
Change in employment shares by occupation 1993 – 2006 in 16 European countries
Fig. 6 Employment polarization in Europe and in the United States
Source: Acemoglu and Autor (2011) and Goos, Manning and Salomons (2009)
Note: Occupations grouped by wage tercile: Low, middle, high.
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intermediate wage levels has declined, 
and in all but one of these countries, both 
employment in low-wage and in high-
wage occupations has grown relative to 
the middle-wage jobs (Figure 6).12 While 
the exact extent and shape of this 
employment polarization varies by coun-
try, it is striking that the same basic pat-
tern is so pervasive despite substantial 
international differences in industry 
structures, labor market regulations, and 
local economic growth. The average 
changes across European countries are 
not just qualitatively, but even quantita-
tively very similar to the trends observed 
in the United States.
The polarization of the occupational 
employment structure invites the ques-
tion whether similar patterns can be 
observed for wages. In the United States, 
this is indeed the case. For Figures 7 and 
8, the several hundred occupations that 
are observed in the U.S. Census have 
been ordered according to their average 
wage in 1980. During the next 25 years, 
both occupational employment and occu-
pational wage growth was larger in the 
highest-paid occupations (on the right 
side of both graphs) and in the lowest- 
paid occupations (on the left) than in 
occupations with intermediate wages 
(towards the center). Closer inspection of 
the data suggests that the very pro-
nounced wage growth in high-wage occu-
pations was driven by managerial and 
professional occupations, whereas wage 
growth in low-wage occupations 
stemmed largely from low-skilled service 
jobs.
International evidence on wage polariza-
tion is sparser and less homogeneous 
than in case of employment polarization. 
Highly paid occupations experienced 
both employment and wage gains in 
many countries, suggesting that the 
growing supply of highly skilled workers 
for these jobs has not kept up with grow-
ing demand. The expansion of employ-
ment in low-paid occupations, however, 
has coincided with either rising, stagnant 
or falling wages, depending on country 
and time period. 
Indeed, the U.S. experience of a com-
bined employment and wage growth in 
low-skilled service occupations is sur-
prising in the context of the SBTC and 
TBTC theories. Both theories predict 
that computers enhance the productivity 
of skilled workers in occupations with 
abstract tasks, and the resulting growing 
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Fig. 7 Employment polarization
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Fig. 8  Wage polarization
Source: Autor and Dorn (2013)
Note: The graph shows occupational employment and wage growth in the 
United States. Occupations are ordered on the x-axis according to their per-
centile in the occupational wage distribution of 1980. Figure 7 measures the 
relative change in an occupation’s share in total employment (for instance, 
an occupation that expands from 1% to 1.2% of total employment has grown 
by 20%). Figure 8 measures the change of the mean log real hourly wage by 
occupation group. Wage changes are expressed in log points, which approxi-
mately correspond to percentage changes. The data series in the graph are 
smoothed.
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demand of firms for skilled workers can 
readily raise their employment and 
wages. However, both theories suggest 
that computers have little effect on the 
productivity of low-skilled workers. In 
the task-based view, the employment 
share of low-skill service occupations 
and other jobs with manual tasks will 
expand relative to employment in the 
routine occupations that become auto-
mated. However, as redundant clerical 
and production workers seek new 
employment in manual task jobs such as 
cleaners and waiters, which are readily 
accessible for workers with little formal 
education, one would expect wages in 
these occupations to fall. The observa-
tion of a combined increase of employ-
ment and wages in low-skilled service 
occupations thus suggests that a second 
force must be at work in addition to 
labor reallocation from routine to man-
ual task-intensive jobs. 
David Autor and I argue that this second 
force is a growing demand for services 
that are produced with low-skilled labor. 
Computerization reduces production 
costs primarily for manufactured goods, 
but not for low-skilled services such as 
cleaning or childcare, where computers 
hardly affect the production process.13 
When consumers perceive goods and ser-
vices to be poor substitutes in consump-
tion, then they react to the falling price of 
goods not by buying a larger quantity, 
but by using some of the money that is 
saved on cheaper goods to purchase more 
services. Increased consumer spending 
on, for instance, restaurant meals then 
increases firms’ labor demand for work-
ers who produce that service. The rising 
demand for low-skilled services and the 
growing supply of workers to these jobs 
due to the automation of routine work 
combine to generate growing employ-
ment in low-skilled service occupations. 
This employment growth can be accom-
panied by wage growth if the demand for 
low-skilled services grows sufficiently 
rapidly relative to the increasing supply 
of workers.
The observation that the demand for 
low-skilled services is increasing is impor-
tant because these jobs can provide 
employment opportunities for workers 
who have little education or job-specific 
training. It strongly contradicts the 
notion that all low-skilled work is rapidly 
becoming obsolete as a consequence of 
computerization.
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A recent paper of the UBS Center Working 
Paper Series studies whether the Swiss labor 
market has polarized analogously to the labor 
markets in the United States and European 
Union. Its authors, Andreas Beerli and Ronald 
Indergand, indeed find evidence for polariza-
tion in Switzerland.
Figure 9 shows a pronounced decline of the 
share of routine task-intensive occupation 
groups in total employment during the period 
of 1980 to 2010. Both production and clerical 
jobs are in decline. Instead, a rising share of 
Swiss employment concentrates in abstract 
task-intensive occupations at the top of the 
wage distribution, such as managers, profes-
sionals, and technicians. In addition, there is 
a small expansion of employment in low-paid 
service and sales occupations. While Figure 
9 is based on data from Swiss-born workers 
only, Beerli and Indergand also observe em-
ployment polarization among immigrants. 
The authors point out that the polarization 
of labor demand is a strong driver of the 
skill-composition of newly arriving immigrants 
explaining, for instance, why their level of 
education has increased considerably in the 
last 30 years.
These unequal fortunes of different occupa-
tion groups are mirrored in their rates of wage 
growth, as shown in Figure 10. From 1991 to 
2011, real wages grew most in the lowest-paid 
occupations (service and sales) and in the 
highest-paid ones (managers, professionals, 
and technicians). By contrast, workers in jobs 
characterized by routine tasks are barely bet-
ter off than in the early 1990s.
Labor market polarization in Switzerland
Average change in employment share per decade since 1980, in %
Fig. 9  Employment polarization in Switzerland 
+4
+2
0
–2
–4
Note: These numbers represent the change in mean log hourly real wages 
per decade of these occupation groups between 1990 and 2010. For 
example, the share of managers grew on average by roughly 1.6 percentage 
points in every decade, so that their share of total employment rose from 
about 6% in 1980 to around 11% in 2010. The data includes Swiss-born 
workers only. 
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the mean log hourly real wages of these occupation groups over the entire 
period from 1991 to 2011.
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The task-based model of technological 
change provides a useful framework for 
thinking about the use of computers and 
robots in the workplace. It has also been 
an empirical success, as its predictions 
about patterns of occupational employ-
ment growth turned out to be consistent 
with evidence from many developed 
countries. However, the fact that comput-
erization could be a plausible explanation 
for employment polarization does not 
imply that it has to be the only explana-
tion for this trend. Most importantly, 
many economists have pointed out that 
in the same period when labor markets 
were exposed to computerization, they 
also faced a rapidly progressing global-
ization.
Globalization is a process of interna-
tional integration that encompasses rising 
trade in goods and services, growth in 
international capital movements, migra-
tion of workers, and dissemination of 
knowledge. Integration has deepened 
along all these dimensions in recent 
decades, and progress in computer and 
communication technology may well 
have acted as a catalyst for that develop-
ment. The use of foreign suppliers, for 
instance, has become more attractive for 
firms thanks to technology that allows 
for easy and cheap communication over 
long distances and seamless tracking of 
shipments.
Globalization provides an alternative 
narrative that could explain the decline 
of middle-wage occupations in many 
developed economies. Workers in pro-
duction and clerical occupations may not 
only be replaced by computers and 
robots, but also by workers in other 
countries where wage levels are lower. 
This spatial reorganization of production 
can take the form of offshoring, where 
multinational firms shift part of their 
operations to another country, or of 
trade competition, where firms in devel-
oped countries reduce employment as 
they succumb to competitive pressure 
from imported goods. Global shifts in 
production are particularly apparent in 
manufacturing, and closely tied to the 
spectacular economic development of 
China. Building on a series of market-
oriented reforms, China evolved from 
being a minor player in international 
trade in the early 1990s to becoming the 
world’s leading exporter of goods in 
recent years. 
The contemporaneous occurrence of 
computerization and globalization makes 
it difficult to estimate their separate 
effects on employment polarization and 
other aggregate outcomes in developed 
economies. My work with David Autor 
and Gordon Hanson proposes to study 
the impact of macroeconomic forces on 
local labor markets in the United States 
in order to overcome this dimensionality 
problem.14 The concept of local labor 
markets builds on the empirical observa-
tion that workers usually seek jobs at 
workplaces located within commutable 
distance from their homes. As a conse-
quence, local labor supply and local 
labor demand combine to form separate 
market equilibria in different localities, 
and spatial variation in real wages and 
employment levels can be quite persistent 
over time.
Firms in different cities and rural areas of 
the United States should all have access 
to the same technologies. Nonetheless, 
the impact of computerization will have 
Technology versus 
Globalization
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indeed shows that historically routine 
task-intensive local labor markets, which 
are dispersed across all regions of the 
U.S., adopted more computers since the 
1980s while witnessing greater declines 
in routine work. As a consequence, local 
labor markets with a high initial employ-
ment share of routine occupations experi-
enced stronger employment polarization 
than locations with comparatively little 
reliance on routine work (Figure 11). 
Moreover, there was also somewhat 
greater wage polarization in these local 
labor markets with greater exposure to 
computers.16
The comparison between local labor 
markets not only allows establishing a 
more direct link between computeriza-
tion and labor market polarization, but 
also permits the separation of the effects 
of computerization from those of global-
ization and other economic forces. In 
spatial variation. This variation stems 
from the fact that local labor markets 
vary in their industry, occupation, and 
task mix. The historical source of local 
specialization can be the geographic 
proximity to important raw materials, 
access to transportation infrastructure, or 
even the serendipitous emergence of an 
important firm around which other 
related businesses cluster.15 Importantly, 
patterns of local specialization are 
remarkably stable even over long periods 
of time. For instance, local labor markets 
that made particularly large use of rou-
tine labor in 1950 still have a dispropor-
tionately routine-intensive occupation 
mix half a century later. The historical 
reliance on routine labor later creates a 
large potential for the replacement of 
workers by computers and robots, and 
thus a particularly pronounced exposure 
of these locations to computerization. An 
empirical analysis of U.S. Census data 
Source: Autor and Dorn (2013)
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Fig. 11 Employment polarization in U.S. local labor markets with different exposure to computers
Note: The graph shows employment polarization in the United States separately for local labor markets with above average and 
below average routine employment in 1980 (high and low exposure to computerization). The vertical axis represents the change in 
an occupation’s share of total employment times 100. 
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research with David Autor and Gordon 
Hanson, I show that the U.S. local labor 
markets which are most exposed to com-
puterization only partially coincide with 
the regions that are most affected by the 
dramatic rise of import competition from 
China. Econometric analysis can there-
fore identify the local labor market 
impacts of these technology and trade 
forces separately.17
An empirical investigation of U.S. Census 
data shows that the extremely rapid 
increase of Chinese import competition 
since the 1990s has led to a substantial 
decline of employment in all occupation 
categories of the manufacturing sector. 
Due to slow reallocation of manufactur-
ing workers to other jobs, this import 
shock has also reduced overall employ-
ment. By contrast, routine task-intensive 
local labor markets have not experienced 
a significant overall job loss due to com-
puterization, but their occupational 
employment structure has polarized both 
within the manufacturing and non-
manufacturing sectors. Consistent with 
the timeline of technology development, 
the loss of routine jobs started with the 
automation of production work in manu-
facturing during the 1980s, and later 
became larger in the service sector as 
computers started to replace clerical 
work.18
Empirical studies focusing on European 
data reach the same conclusion as the 
analyses for the United States: The adop-
tion of computers and robots has not 
caused a notable decline in overall 
employment. However, computerization 
contributes to labor market polarization, 
as middle-wage routine occupations 
decline while high-wage abstract and 
low-wage manual occupations expand.19
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How Can Workers Succeed in a 
Computerized Labor Market?
Computers are transforming the occupa-
tional composition of the labor market. 
Young adults who enter the labor market 
today face a very different set of job 
opportunities than their parents a genera-
tion ago. Many production and clerical 
occupations with intermediate wages hire 
fewer workers than they used to, and 
employment polarization is particularly 
pronounced among the young, who are 
becoming disproportionately concen-
trated in high-wage and low-wage jobs.20 
The continued availability of jobs in low-
skilled service occupations also offers 
employment opportunities to workers 
who have little formal education. Yet the 
workers who stand to gain most are those 
in the highly paid managerial and profes-
sional occupations where productivity has 
risen thanks to computer technology.
It is thus an easy policy recommendation 
that more schooling is desirable in order 
to help cohorts of young workers succeed 
in the labor market. After all, the rise of 
the wage differential between workers 
with and without university education 
suggests that the growth in the relative 
supply of highly educated individuals has 
fallen short of the growth in relative 
demand for their labor. 
The policy response to technological 
change should, however, not just be more 
education, but also different education. 
Computers have changed, and will con-
tinue to change the demand for job tasks 
in the labor market. Therefore, education 
should build skills in those tasks where 
human capabilities remain superior to 
machines, and not in dimensions where 
machines have the edge. An education 
that emphasizes rote memorization and 
mental arithmetic is no longer able to 
produce skilled workers who can hope to 
outdo computers in terms of information 
storage or calculation. Victories of com-
puters over extremely accomplished 
humans in quiz shows and chess competi-
tions have impressively shown the tre-
mendous advantage that machines now 
have in such tasks.
An education that prepares young people 
for the task demands of the 21st century 
should thus seek to strengthen skills in 
these areas, for instance by fostering 
problem-solving abilities and communica-
tion skills through case study projects, 
group work, and other modern forms of 
teaching that complement a more tradi-
tional mode of instruction based on lec-
tures and memorization.
A greater focus on individualized cus-
tomer interaction and on innovation and 
problem solving can also provide a per-
spective for some of the shrinking middle-
wage occupations. Clerical and produc-
tion jobs that integrate these non-
routine tasks cannot be as readily auto-
mated as jobs that only execute routine 
tasks, at least not without a substantial 
loss in quality. A machine operator who 
has a thorough understanding of the 
machine’s operation, and of the produc-
Humans retain an advantage 
over machines when it comes 
to problem solving, creativity, 
and interaction with other 
humans.  
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tion process it is embedded in, is harder 
to replace than an operator who is just 
familiar with a few buttons on the 
machine’s operating panel. The former 
will be able to quickly resolve problems 
and may even propose improvements that 
raise the efficiency of the production pro-
cess. Similarly, a salesperson who expertly 
advises customers and carefully responds 
to individual customer requests will not 
as easily lose her job to a machine as a 
colleague who merely swipes credit cards 
at the cash register. These jobs with virtu-
ous bundles of job tasks do not require a 
university education, but benefit from a 
high-quality vocational training system 
that combines hands-on experience on the 
job with schooling that is tailored to the 
need of a specific occupation.
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The prediction that labor-saving technol-
ogy inevitably causes a long-term rise in 
unemployment has been proven wrong 
many times in history, and again during 
the first few decades of computer adop-
tion. Yet the question persists whether the 
theory of task-biased technological 
change, which currently guides many 
economists’ understanding of computers’ 
impact on the labor market, will remain 
useful in the future as technology evolves 
further. 
A prime example for the expanding possi-
bilities of technology is the driverless car. 
Just over a decade ago, academic research 
listed truck drivers as one example of a 
manual task-intensive occupation that 
cannot readily be substituted for by tech-
nology.21 In the meantime, however, an 
immanent automation of their jobs seems 
inevitable to many observers. And once it 
is possible to automate drivers, then the 
replacement of other manual occupations 
by robots may not be far away.
However, enthusiastic predictions about 
rapid development and adoption of tech-
nology frequently underestimate the chal-
lenges on the path from an experimental 
prototype to a large-scale market intro-
duction of a new product. The driverless 
car, for instance, will only find wide-
spread use once improved technology 
allows it to negotiate difficult road condi-
tions, once its production costs have been 
lowered substantially, and once the legal 
questions surrounding its use have been 
resolved. None of these arguments 
negates the possibility that driverless cars 
will dominate the streetscape a few years 
from now. Yet each of these obstacles has 
the potential to greatly diminish the new 
technology’s success. Other means of 
transportation that were once announced 
as great breakthroughs, including super-
sonic airplanes, maglev trains, or solar 
vehicles, have never become cheap and 
powerful enough to be adopted widely in 
the economy. 
A further limit to automation stems from 
the fact that human workers often execute 
a more diverse bundle of tasks than those 
that a computer or robot can replace. A 
truck driver for instance not only steers a 
truck through traffic, but also loads, con-
trols, and unloads the cargo; deals with 
the accompanying paper work; and takes 
care of maintenance and small repairs. 
The driverless technology alone will thus 
not be able to substitute for all the work a 
truck driver does. In some situations, it is 
feasible to split up the task bundle of an 
occupation, and have machines execute 
some parts while other tasks remain in the 
hands of humans. One example is bank 
tellers. The work that used to be done by 
a teller is now split into dispensation of 
cash, a routine task that automated teller 
machines handle, and a large set of other 
customer services, which human employ-
ees still execute. A counterexample to this 
unbundling of tasks is airline pilots. The 
first crossing of the Atlantic Ocean by a 
plane flown by an autopilot took place in 
1947. But in the almost seven decades 
since, the job of the airline pilot has not 
disappeared because pilots are still needed 
onboard a plane in order to react to 
unforeseen conditions such as a failure of 
the aircraft’s engines or instruments. 
Overall, past experience suggests that 
predictions of immanent dramatic tech-
nology development should be assessed 
with a healthy dose of skepticism. Yet it 
is still reasonable to expect that the 
boundaries between automatable and 
non-automatable tasks will continue to 
Will the Lessons of the Past 
Remain Relevant in the Future?
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shift as computers and robots become 
more powerful and versatile. So far, com-
puters’ primary strength has been the exe-
cution of tasks that can be characterized 
by precisely defined routines, and it 
stands to reason that this fundamental 
insight will remain valid even as a gradu-
ally expanding set of tasks becomes acces-
sible for computer routines.
If instead a paradigm shift should occur, 
then it may be due to advances in 
machine learning. A key obstacle to the 
automation of non-routine tasks is the 
difficulty for human programmers to 
specify all the work steps of these tasks 
exactly in a computer program. Machine 
learning can help overcome this obstacle 
by allowing computers to guess the opti-
mal answer to a problem using inductive 
statistical techniques rather than formal 
procedural rules. A concrete example is 
the task of visually identifying a chair.22 
A conventional computer program may 
specify the typical constituting features of 
a chair, such as a raised surface, four legs, 
and a backrest. An accordingly pro-
grammed computer will recognize many 
regular chairs, but not atypical models 
that have only three legs or lack a back-
rest. However, if the programmer were to 
relax the criteria for the identification of a 
chair, then the computer would start mis-
classifying other objects like cabinets or 
tables as chairs. While it is easy for 
humans to distinguish chairs from other 
pieces of furniture intuitively, it is surpris-
ingly difficult to convey this human intu-
ition to a computer. Machine learning 
seeks to circumvent this problem. Instead 
of providing the computer with a rule-
based script to identify chairs, the 
machine is fed with a training library of 
labeled pictures or 3-D scans of chairs 
and other objects. This data allows the 
computer to statistically infer which attri-
butes increase the likelihood that a given 
object is a chair. If the statistical model is 
sufficiently good, then the computer 
should become able to identify other 
chairs accurately that were not part of 
the initial training library.
How “intelligent” can computers become 
through machine learning? Some research-
ers predict that growing computing power 
and better training databases will eventu-
ally allow machines to reach or even 
exceed many human capabilities. Others, 
however, expect that machines will remain 
error-prone. Figure 12 shows the result of 
a machine learning experiment where a 
computer identified two objects as chairs 
that both have a space to sit on and a 
backrest. However, one of these objects is 
actually an overturned table. While it 
seems certain that machine learning tech-
nology will improve, it remains an open 
question whether computers will ever be 
able to fully understand the intended pur-
pose of an object, just as a human would 
immediately realize that an overturned 
table is not meant for seating.
Fig. 12 The next frontier? Objects correctly and incorrectly identified 
 as chairs by machine learning
Source: Grabner, Gall and Van Gool (2011)
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Computer technology has transformed the 
organization of work during the last four 
decades. As robots and computers can 
substitute for human labor, many observ-
ers worry that technological progress will 
inevitably lead to mass unemployment. 
Historical evidence suggests that these 
concerns are likely exaggerated. Despite 
rapid technological progress and automa-
tion since at least the Industrial Revolu-
tion, unemployment has not dramatically 
expanded over time. Instead, employment 
shifted from the sectors that automated 
the most to other sectors that experienced 
less technological progress, as well as 
emerging sectors that were created by new 
technology.
Empirical research finds that computers 
have little impact on overall employment, 
but contribute to rising labor market 
inequality. Machines have overtaken 
humans in their capability to execute well-
defined routine tasks precisely, and many 
of the production and clerical jobs that 
specialize in such tasks have been irrevers-
ibly lost. The employment structure of 
labor markets in developed countries 
becomes increasingly polarized as employ-
ment concentrates in a set of highly paid 
and a set of lowly paid occupations that 
both are difficult to automate. The former 
set includes managerial and professional 
occupations that require such skills as 
leadership, creativity, or problem solving, 
while the latter include service occupa-
tions that combine the tasks of visual rec-
ognition, verbal communication, and fine 
motoric movement.
As computerization changes the composi-
tion of human labor rather than decreas-
ing its overall amount, policymakers 
should not primarily be concerned about 
mass unemployment. Instead, the more 
immanent policy challenges caused by 
computerization result from changing skill 
demands in the labor market and rising 
economic inequality among workers.
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